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Voir Dire - Prevention of
Prejudicial Questioning
Voir dire is justified by the need to select an impartial
jury. It is, however, often used improperly to influence
prospective jurors. The author of this Note examines the
need for voir dire, the abuses that occur, and the prob-
lems inherent in curbing abuse without restricting the se-
lection process. He concludes that limitations on the scope
of questioning provide the best solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voir dire -the process of orally examining prospective jurors
to determine whether they are qualified for jury service - is a
point of pivotal importance in any jury trial. Voir dire question-
ing, by obtaining competent, disinterested, and unbiased jurors,
is intended to implement the parties' right to a fair and impartial
jury. The broad scope of examination commonly permitted by
trial courts, however, has resulted in the use of voir dire for pur-
poses other than the selection of an impartial jury. It is well
recognized that voir dire may afford a prudent attorney a tactical
opportunity to introduce both himself and his case to the jury.2
Or an alert attorney can prejudice the position of the opposing
party by framing inquiries which are intended to precommit the
decision of prospective jurors and which introduce extraneous
matters designed to influence their partialities. Unfortunately,
existing procedural devices are inadequate to protect the non-
questioning party from such abuses The purpose of this Note is
to consider the effects of broad voir dire questioning on the non-
questioning party and to recommend a solution which balances
the rights of both parties.
I1. PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE
Since early common law the right to challenge prospective
1. Davis & Wiley, 49 Thoughts on Jury Selection, 9 TRIAL LAw. GuMDE 110
(May 1965); Field, Voir Dire Examination-A Neglected Art, 33 UNIVERSITY
OF M o. AT KANSAS CiTy L. Rnv. 171, 172 (1965); Kennelly, Jury Selection in
a Civil Case, 9 Tnmx. LAw. GuDE 15 (May 1965).
2. BoDiN, SELECTING A JuRY 1 (1948).
3. See generally Goodman, Should California Adopt Federal Civil Proce-
dure?, 40 CAIiF. L. REv. 184, 189 (1952); Perkins, Some Needed Reforms in
the Methods of Selecting Juries, 13 Mir. L. Rnv. 391, 399 (1915); Vanderbilt,
Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.UL.
REv. 1, 73 (1956); Note, 12 IowA L. Rnv. 433, 436 (1927); Note, 58 YAE L.J.
638, 642 (1949).
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jurors has been recognized as a means to insure a fair and impar-
tial jury.4 Early common law procedure required the juror to be
challenged before he could be examined by counsel; voir dire was
then used to produce evidence to support the challenge8 In con-
trast, today voir dire is used to uncover grounds for a challenge,6
and it may or may not be conducted by counsel. Although the
federal constitution 7 and most state constitutions" grant a right
to a fair and impartial jury, attorney-conducted voir dire is not
an essential attribute of that right.9 As a result, in the federal
courts,'I and also in several states," the judge may personally con-
duct the voir dire in his discretion. The actual challenging of pro-
spective jurors, however, remains in the hands of the attorneys. 2
Prospective jurors may be challenged for cause or peremptorily
challenged without assigning cause.' 3 Challenges for cause seek to
4. See 3 BLACKSTONE, ComnIExTARmEs *358-66 (civil); 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMNTA uES *352-55 (criminal).
5. See generally Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 16 GEo. LJ.
488, 441-44 (1928).
6. E.g., Duffy v. Carroll, 137 Conn. 51, 56, 75 Aad 33, 35 (1950); Cher-
nock v. State, 208 Md. 147, 150, 99 A.2d 748, 749 (1953); State v. Tharp, 42
Wash. 2d 494, 499-500, 256 Pad 482, 486 (1953). But see Hagans v. State, 77
Ga. App. 513, 514, 48 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1948).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (impartial jury in criminal cases); U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (right to jury trial in civil cases). Although not expressly provided
for, the seventh amendment has been interpreted to require an impartial jury,
either because of the influence of the common law, Thiel v. Southern Pac. Ry.,
328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946), or through the fifth amendment requirement of due
process of law. Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.RD. 409, 465 (1960).
8. E.g., MwN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4 (civil juries), § 6 (criminal juries). Even
if it is not expressed, the right to jury trial implies a right to an impartial
jury since most state constitutions provide that the right to jury trial "shall
remain inviolate." See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 4. This indicates that the
right to an impartial jury is retained from the common law.
9. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928); Carroll v.
United States, 16 Fad 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1927); Bradshaw v. United States, 15
F.ad 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1926).
10. See F D. R. Civ. P. 47; FED. R. C im. P. 24(a).
11. See, e.g., .1. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.24-1 (1965). In Illinois, how-
ever, the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to supplement the
court's examination. For discussion of the Illinois procedure see Carr, Voir
Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal by an Attorney, 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
653; Crebs, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Aptpraisal by a Judge, 1963
U. I L. L.F. 644; Comment, 15 DE PAuL L. Ruv. 107 (1965).
12. Some states grant the right to challenge by judicial decision, e.g., Hall
v. State, 64 Ga. App. 644, 13 S.E.2d 868 (1941), while in others it is granted
through statute, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. CoDn § 4108.
18. E.g., -L. R v. STAT. ch. 110, § 66 (1965) (peremptory challenges);
MNxn. STAT. § 631.28 (1961) (challenge for cause). For a categorization and
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1088
reject a prospective juror for reasons which satisfy the court that
he cannot or will not render an impartial verdict. For convenience
such challenges may be classified into two categories. General
cause is based on factors which disqualify a juror for any case;
particular cause is based on factors which disqualify a juror for
the specific case before the court' 4 Grounds for general cause 5
include such matters as age,'6 moral character, 17 significant phys-
ical or mental infirmities,18 or citizenship and residency. 9
Grounds for particular cause include both those established by
law, such as relationship to a party"0 or his attorney,21 and those
designated as actual bias. Actual bias is not clearly definable; gen-
erally it means a state of mind such that the juror cannot try the
issues impartially. 2 For example, prejudice against large ver-
dicts,23 or opposition to capital punishment,24 may constitute
actual bias. The sufficiency of a showing of cause is generally de-
termined solely by the trial judge,2 although his ruling will be
reviewable on appeal. 6
discussion of challenges at common law, see 1 THOMPSON, TRuL 35 (Early
ed. 1912); Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 16 GEO. L.J. 488 (1928).
14. At common law these two categories were classified as principal chal-
lenges and challenges to the polls. 1 ThoMPsoN, TiR s 55-56 (Early ed. 1912).
Thompson states that since the demise of the practice of using nonjudge triers
to determine the validity of challenges, this distinction is no longer followed.
15. Grounds for general cause may include those in the general qualifica-
tions for jury duty. See, e.g., N.Y. CoDE. CHmm. PRoo. § 875(2).
16. E.g., Is. Rav. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1965).
17. E.g., Dodys v. State, 73 Ga. App. 488, 37 S.E.2d 173 (1946) (conviction
for a crime involving moral turpitude).
18. E.g., M m. STAT. § 631.29(3) (1961).
19. E.g., Mo. Rur. STAT. § 494.010 (1959).
20. E.g., N.Y. CoDE Camm. PRoc. § 377(1).
21. E.g., Minx. STAT. § 631.31(1) (1961).
22. Statutory attempts to define actual bias refer to it as a state of mind
which, in reference to the case at hand, evidences an inability to try the case
impartially or without prejudice. E.g., M1nN. STAT. § 631.30 (1961).
23. In Snyder v. General Elec. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 60, 287 P.2d 108 (1955), a
prospective juror on voir dire stated that he would require more proof to
render a verdict for over $50,000 than for under $50,000. This was a sufficient
basis for a challenge for cause.
24. Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441, 37 So. 2d 753 (1948).
25. Shettel v. United States, 113 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Johnson v.
People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 Pad 789 (1943); State v. Rhodes, 227 Iowa 332,
288 N.W. 98 (1939). But see MaIn. STAT. § 631.35(2) (1961), which provides
that in the trial of a challenge for actual bias, three court-appointed triers
shall determine the sufficiency of the challenge. In any noncapital case the
parties may consent to have such challenges tried by the court. All challenges
for implied bias shall be tried by the court. See VmhNm. STAT. § 681.85(1)
(1961).
26. Courts have stated that a ruling on a challenge for cause is a mixed
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In contrast to the challenge for cause, the peremptory chal-
lenge requires neither a reason nor a ruling from the courL7 Al-
though historically unclear, the rationale of peremptory chal-
lenges is to permit a party to dismiss an unwanted prospective
juror who cannot be successfully challenged for cause because of
difficulties of proof.2 s It also has been suggested that peremp-
tories promote party satisfaction with the jury.F9 Whatever its
rationale, the peremptory challenge is available in all jurisdic-
tions"0 with variations as to the number allowed 8' and the time of
exercise."
Questioning on voir dire supposedly provides information
which permits the court to rule on challenges for cause, and also
assists counsel to exercise peremptories effectively. 8 Jurisdictions
vary on procedural matters such as whether the prospective jurors
are examined collectively3 4 or individually, 5 whether they are
sworn before being examined,386 and the order in which parties
direct questions and exercise challenges.3 7 All jurisdictions, how-
ever, recognize that the scope of voir dire is controlled by the trial
question of fact and law. Hall v. State, 186 la. 644, 666-67, 187 So. 892, 402
(1939). As to challenges for implied bias, the question is subject to broad review
as if it were one of law. Mitchell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 771, 777, 26 SX.2d 663,
668 (1943). But where jurors give conflicting answers to questions for actual
bias, the trial court will only be reversed if it abused its discretion. People v.
Workman, 56 P.d 1280, 1281-82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
27. Frazier v. United States, 835 U.S. 497, 505 (1948); Buflord v. State,
148 Neb. 38, 26 N.W2d 883 (1947).
28. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
29. Ibid.
80. E.g., MinN. STAT. § 681.27 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 957.03 (1961).
81. Under early common law, a defendant in a felony case was allowed
thirty-five peremptory challenges. Moore, supra note 18, at 447. An accused
in the federal courts is allowed twenty peremptories in a capital case, ten in a
felony case, and three in a misdemeanor case. FED. R. Cam. P. 24(b).
82. In New York a peremptory must be taken before the juror is sworn.
N.Y. CODE Caim. Pnoc. § 871. This appears to be the majority rule, but in
State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 80 So. 2d 837 (1947), the state was permitted
to interpose peremptories after the jurors had been sworn.
33. E.g., Duffy v. Carroll, 187 Conn. 51, 56, 75 A.2d 83, 35 (1950).
84. E.g., Commonwealth v. Morrison, 180 Pa. Super. 121, 118 A.2d 258
(1955).
35. E.g., Barton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 810, 60 SE.2d 173 (1950).
86. Compare Springdale Park, Inc. v. Andriotis, 30 NJ. Super. 257, 104
A.2d 827 (1954), with State v. Sharpe, 138 S.C. 58, 185 S.E. 635 (1926).
37. Absent a statute, the order of challenging between the parties seems
to be within the discretion of the court. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 410 (1894). The New York statute, which provides that the people will
exercise their challenges before the defendant, is typical. N.Y. CODE Cmi.
Paoc. § 385.
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court, subject to a limitation of fairness.38 Any question which is
incident to establishing general cause or implied bias must be
allowed 9 The propriety of permitting questions intended to
establish actual bias or to facilitate the exercise of peremptories,
however, has been left entirely to the discretion of the trial court.40
Although questions are sometimes held improper,41 trial courts
generally permit a wide scope of examination.2 This liberal judi-
cial ,attitude is based on the constitutional right to a fair and im-
partial jury, together with the fact that voir dire is thought to be
essential to insure this right.45
I. ABUSES OF VOIR DIRE
The broad scope of examination has permitted the questioning
party to precommit and influence the jury in his favor. Since
jurors are to decide the case solely on the facts presented at trial,"
precommitting or influencing the jury on voir dire denies the non-
questioning party his right to an impartial jury.
38. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). Voir dire cannot
be governed by fixed rules due to the uniqueness of a particular case and the
parties involved, the individuality of counsel, and the necessity of the jury
representing a cross section of society. Smith v. Nickels, 390 S.W.2d 578, 582
(Mo. Ct. App. 1965). See also State v. Hawkins, 240 S.W.2d 688, 693-94
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1951).
39. The grounds for general cause and implied bias are usually set forth
by statute. To disallow questions which will directly reveal such grounds is
error. See, e.g., Cady v. State, 198 Ga. 99, 31 SXE.2d 38 (1944).
40. See Greenman v. City of Fort Worth, 308 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957).
41. Questions which disclose a juror's present impression, or what his reac-
tion will be under certain facts, should be disallowed because of the danger
that the juror may be precommitted. Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518,
100 A.2d 467 (1953). It is improper to commit jurors before they have heard
any evidence, instructions of the court, or arguments of counsel. State v. Katz
Drug Co., 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1961). Hypotheticals substantially outlining
the proof to be introduced are improper as tending to exact a pledge from the
juror, Chambers v. Bradley County, 384 S.W.2d 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). It
is improper to emphasize facts such as insurance with the view of conveying
to the jury the idea that the insurer will be the one to pay the judgment.
Bunch v. Crader, 369 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
42. E.g., Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 49-50 (4th Cir.
1963); Logan v. State, 251 Ala. 441, 443, 37 So. 2d 753, 755 (1948); State v.
Wallace, 83 Ariz. 220, 222, 319 P.2d 529, 530 (1957); State v. Higgs, 143
Conn. 138, 142, 120 A.2d 152, 154 (1956); People v. Moretti, 6 Ill. 2d 494, 532,
129 N.E.2d 709, 729 (1955); State v. Sullivan, 43 NJ. 209, 239, 203 A.2d 177,
193 (1964).
43. See Fedorinchik v. Stewart, 289 Mich. 436, 438-39, 286 N.W. 673, 674
(1939).
44. 1 HO[LSWORTH, HISTORY o ENGLI-s LAw 346-47 (6th ed. 1938).
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Probably the most prevalent method which attempts to pre-
commit the judgment of the jurors is the use of a hypothetical
question which asks the prospective juror to assume facts and to
state his conclusion based on the assumed facts.4 5 For example,
a juror may be asked whether he could return the death penalty
if the killing was done in an attempt to commit robbery. 0 Such a
question is improper because the jury should decide the issues on
the evidence produced at trial, and not be psychologically pre-
committed by answers given on voir dire.
Hypothetical questions intended to test the reactions of pro-
spective jurors to certain witnesses are also objectionable. For
example, the questioning attorney may ask what weight the
examinee would give the testimony of a "Chinaman." Such infor-
mation is sought to enable counsel to plan his trial strategy bet-
ter.!" However, this question seeks the examinee's evaluation of
testimony before he has heard or observed the witness. If a witness
of Chinese descent does testify, the juror will tend to react to such
a witness' testimony as his answer on voir dire indicated.
Another type of improper question, and more subtle in effect,
is one that introduces extraneous matter which may influence pro-
spective jurors. Such questions are objectionable whether the
matter introduced is -admissible or inadmissible at trial. For in-
stance, evidence of liability insurance generally is inadmissible at
trial;49 however, jurors may be asked on voir dire if they are as-
sociated with an insurance company.50 As a result, counsel on voir
dire may create the implication that defendant has insurance coy-
45. Examples of hypothetical questions on voir dire can be found in Annot.,
99 AL.R.2d 7 (1965). In civil cases the hypothetical is often used to uncover
prejudice against large verdicts, although it is generally permissible to examine
with respect to size of verdict if such questions are phrased in general terms.
Jones v. Parrott, 111 Ga. App. 750, 143 S&E.2d 393 (1965). It is difficult to
imagine a hypothetical question which would be effective in discovering such
a prejudice that would not tend to precommit the juror to a particular verdict.
46. See State v. Bunk, 4 NJ. 461, 7s A.2d 249 (1950).
47. A question of this type contains the assumption that a particular
witness will festify and the juror is asked what weight he will give to such
testimony. The reason for allowing such a question is that it may divulge a
bias against a certain type of witness. For example, it was held to be improper
for the trial court to refuse to ask jurors if they would be prejudiced against
the testimony of witnesses of official status. Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
48. Carr, supra note 11.
49. See, e.g., Schultz v. Swift & Co., 210 Minn. 533, 299 N.W. 7 (1941);
Brand v. Mangust Holding Corp., 53 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
50. See, e.g., Farwell v. Stambaugh, 203 Minn. 392, 281 N.W. 526 (1938);
Wood v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 257 App. Div. 172, 12 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1939).
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erage. Since evidence inadmissible at trial is not to be considered
by the jury,51 such a use of voir dire can be prejudicial to the
defendant 2 The policy underlying the rules of evidence dictates
that inadmissible evidence should not be suggested to jurors
through voir dire questioning.
Questions concerning material which is admissible at trial may
also raise inferences which create bias.P The reference to the
material on voir dire rather than at trial is objectionable because
it has not yet been offered as evidence. For example, a prospec-
tive juror is asked whether he would convict of rape if the state
proves the defendant raped and communicated venereal disease
to a little girl." Such a question, by implying that the girl has
such a disease, could lead the jury to infer there is strong evidence
of rape. Obviously such medical testimony may be introduced at
trial, but there it must meet the requirements of the rules of evi-
Some courts require that before counsel may examine as to insurance on
voir dire he must have some previous knowledge that one or more prospective
jurors are interested in insurance companies. E.g., Ewing Von Allmen Dairy
Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky. 161, 200 S.W.2d 103 (1947). Others require counsel
to give the court, out of hearing of the jury, a reason for asking the ques-
tion. Carter v. Rock Island Bus Lines, Inc., 345 Mo. 1170, 139 S.W.2d 458
(1940).
51. E.g., Brown v. Walter, 62 FY2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933).
52. It has been suggested that the only proper way to handle the problem
of insurance is to inquire of the entire panel, at the beginning of the term
before the jurors know what cases will be called, whether they have interests
in any insurance company. This information could then be made available to
counsel, and incompetent jurors could be dismissed without the necessity of
letting the panel know that insurance is involved. Nilles, The Right to Inter-
rogate Jurors Wit& Reference to Insurance in Negligence Cases, 3 DAKOTA L.
Rav. 406, 413 (1931); Note, 10 U. Cinc. L. Rnv. 315, 318 (1936); 52 HARv.
L. Rnv. 166 (1938); 87 U. PA. L. Rnv. 234 (1938). It is said that this solu-
tion satisfies the interests of both parties, since the plaintiff learns whether a
juror is connected with an insurance company, and yet the panel is not aware
that insurance is a factor in the case. 10 U. Circ. L. REv. 315, 818 (1936).
Conceivably, a similar practice could be extended to other matters arising
on voir dire which prejudice the nonquestioning party.
53. Because of the broad subject matter which may be inquired into on
voir dire, this type of question is prevalent. The problem created is that an
element in the case is suggested to the juror without the necessity of having to
prove it. For instance, if counsel wants to suggest that self-defense may 'be an
element and wants to implant this in the juror's mind, he will ask a question
containing the word "self-defense." Suppose counsel asks a juror if the fact
that an officer of the law were involved would affect his belief in self-defense.
Here the question apparently is an attempt to discover or reveal a bias against
law officers, but it latently implies that self-defense is an element in the case.
54. See Fields v. State, 203 Ark. 1046, 159 S.W.2d 745 (1942).
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dence, and the witness testifying to the matter will be subject to
cross examination. Moreover, if the matter is raised on voir dire,
the jurors may have it in mind throughout the trial and thus be
prevented from objectively weighing the evidence.
With regard to questions which tend to precommit decision or
to introduce extraneous influential matter, it is not significant if
the question is not answered. The evil arises from the mere utter-
ance of the question. A juror may make a predetermination or
draw inferences even though he does not answer or gives a nega-
tive answer.
The seriousness of the abuses of voir dire is magnified when
the ineffectiveness of the nonquestioning party's remedial devices
is recognized. A party who feels his opponent has precommitted
or wrongly influenced a prospective juror at voir dire has three
choices: he can object to the improper question;5 5 he can appeal
if his objection is overruled;5 6 or he can exercise a peremptory
challenge.
The most immediate course of action open to the nonquestion-
ing party is to object to the question as improper. 7 If an objection
is sustained, the objecting party will be protected only if the court
removes the juror on its own initiative 8 or grants a challenge for
cause. Once an improper question has been asked, the harm has
been done, so merely striking it is not sufficient. A dismissal of the
particular examinee to whom the question was addressed, how-
ever, does not provide an adequate remedy if the entire panel
heard the question. 59 But for the impracticality, perhaps all pro-
spective jurors who heard the improper question should be dis-
missed o
55. See, e.g., Koss v. United States, 77 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1935) (right to
object ends when fair and impartial jury is chosen); Cross v. State, 89 Fla. 212,
108 So. 686 (1926).
56. See note 26 mpra.
57. The objection must be made seasonably or it is waived. Ball v. State,
252 Ala. 686, 42 So. 2d 626 (1949); Bufford v. State, 148 Neb. 88, 26 N.W.2d
38 (1947).
58. The court has wide discretion to determine whether a juror should be
removed without challenge. State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 89, 151 AtU. 325 (1980).
59. It is within the discretion of the court whether a juror is to be exam-
ined in the presence of the whole panel. Wientjes v. Commonwealth, 263
S.W.2d 721 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); LeFors v. State, 180 Tex. Crim. 426, 94
S.W.2d 788 (1986).
60. This is completely impractical since it would have to be done each time
an improper question was asked. Courts are unwilling to allow each juror to
be examined out of the hearing and presence of others. As one court stated,
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Courts often refuse to sustain objections to prejudicial ques-
tions on voir dire, despite the frequently expressed rule that ques-
tions which precommit or influence jurors are improper. This
reluctance to disallow such questions is largely based on the ra-
tionale that allowing a wide scope of examination will safeguard
the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, since
it is difficult to determine whether a question will precommit or
otherwise wrongly influence a juror,6' the courts generally exercise
their discretion in favor of a liberal construction of the constitu-
tional right.
Appeal is not an adequate vehicle to deal with the problems
created by unfairness at voir dire because of the traditional nar-
row scope of review on appeal. Appellate courts, in the absence of
a clear abuse, will not disturb the exercise of discretion by the
trial court.6 2 A clear showing of abuse is required because the
propriety of questions generally is not clearly revealed by the
record.68 Moreover, to prevail on appeal, prejudice must be estab-
lished. In order to prove prejudice, the objecting party is usually
required to show that the examinee served on the jury and the
appellant had exhausted his peremptories at the time the objec-
tionable question was asked 4 These prerequisities do not ade-
quately reflect the possible prejudice which the party may have
suffered.6 5
The remedy of -a peremptory challenge of prospective jurors
it would be a "backward step" in the administration of justice to hold that
voir dire must be so conducted, notwithstanding the adverse effect on the re-
mainder of the panel. Levermann v. Cartall, 893 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
61. City Transp. Co. v. Sisson, 365 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. iv. App. 1968),
illustrates the fine lines courts draw in determining whether a question is
improper. The court held a question asking the juror whether he would con-
sider evidence of appellee's use of narcotics for any purpose to be improper.
But a question asking if the juror would form any bias toward appellee if,
during trial, evidence of use of narcotics should be introduced was held proper.
If one of these questions tends to precommit or influence the juror, the other
would certainly seem to have the same tendency.
62. See, e.g., Goosman v. A. Dule Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963);
Jones v. Parrot, 111 Ga. App. 750, 143 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
63. Smith v. Nickels, 390 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
64. E.g., Clem v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 429, 314 S.W.2d 579 (1958); see 58
YArn L.T. 638, 643 (1949).
65. If the whole panel has heard the question, they are all susceptible to
the harmful effects of a question. Thus, the fact the examinee did not serve
on the jury will be of little importance. Also, peremptories will be of little
value since the nonquestioning party cannot strike the entire panel.
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whom the nonquestioning party feels have been wrongly influ-
enced or precommitted is always available. The effectiveness of
this remedy, however, is diminished by the fact that the entire
panel may have been influenced by the objectionable question
while the number of peremptories is limited0
IV. REASSESSMIENT OF VOIR DIRE
The function of the jury is to resolve factual disputes which
are in issue0 7 Ideally, to serve this function, jurors should be
completely impartial; however, absolute impartially is unattain-
able. No matter how extensive or penetrating the voir dire exam-
ination, all the biases and predilections of the jurors will not be
revealed. Moreover, to contend that voir dire examinations, being
nonpsychological in nature, could ever reveal all the factors in-
fluencing a juror would be to disregard completely the force and
effect of the subconscious mind. 8 Even if all factors influencing
the jurors could be revealed by proper questions, there is no
certainty that jurors would reveal that their deliberations might
be affected by questions on voir direP9 Indeed, it is doubtful that
a juror would be aware that his mind had been precommitted or
prejudiced by a subtle albeit improper question.
The factfinding function of the jury is not an entirely rational
process since many fact issues can be reasonably resolved in more
than one way. At some point in reaching its decision, the jury
necessarily exercises value judgments 0 which are made with refer-
ence to the jurors' experiences in society.71 These value judgments,
66. This limitation is magnified when the challenging party must inally
accept or reject a prospective juror without a chance to compare him with
others. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894). See also 24 U. Cm. L.
Rnv. 751, 757-59 (1956). For a thorough examination of the peremptory as a
protective device, see id. at 752-57.
67. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury- Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm.
L. 1 Ev. 886, 887 (1953).
68.
Fundamentally, of course, whether a juror is fair and impartial lies
peculiarly in the mind and heart of the individual juror. Whatever lurk-
ing prejudice he might have in a particular instance may well he
exposed only through psychological analysis. Suffice it to say that such
a personalized approach is not within the province of the courts and the
practical administration of justice.
Smith v. Nickels, 390 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
69. 60 CoLurm. L. RPv. 849, 375 (1960).
70. Broeder, supra note 67, at 889.
71. 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENISH L&W 349 (6th ed. 1938).
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however, should not vary in cases involving similar issues and
similarly situated parties. That is, value judgments should not be
a function of the particular case or particular parties involved.
Any jurors whose qualifications indicate that they are not able to
decide the issues involved in such a manner are not impartial.72
The broad scope of examination allowed in voir dire to help
disclose impartiality affords considerable advantages to the ques-
tioning party. Extensive questioning is more likely to ferret out
jury biases unfavorable to his case.75 While there are other ad-
vantages to be gained by an attorney on voir dire, the discovery
of bias is the only result of broad examination which is incident
to the questioning party's constitutional right to an impartial
jury. Any other advantages achieved by the questioning are not
due as a matter of right.
The conflict between the parties' rights with regard to voir
dire is evident. A broad scope of examination effectuates the right
of the questioning party to an impartial jury, but allows jurors
to be precommitted or wrongly influenced. Consequently, it is
apparent that the rights of both parties must be balanced in
delineating the limits of voir dire. Roughly speaking, the right to
examine jurors must be curtailed at the point where it denies the
nonquestioning party his right to a fair and impartial jury.
In order to protect the nonquestioning party, several jurisdic-
tions allow the court to conduct the entire voir dire.74 It is thought
that abuses will be curtailed because the examining judge will be
impartial when compared to the attorneys.7 5 The use of a court-
conducted voir dire will eliminate conscious attempts to pre-
commit or influence jurors. Moreover, an immediate advantage
of such a procedure is that questions thought to be objectionable
by the trial judge will never be asked. Thus both parties will be
protected from the effect that objectionable questions have on the
entire panel. If the broad scope of examination remains, however,
72. 60 COLUm. I. REV. 349, 350 (1960).
73. E.g., a question which reveals a juror's connection with an insurance
company will aid a plaintiff's counsel. If one who has such an interest is left
on the jury, this will be an unfavorable element because it may be inferred
that this juror's tendency will be to disallow or diminish the recovery.
74. See, e.g., Fim. R. Civ. P. 47; FED. R. Cmm. P. 24(a).
75. Vanderbilt, Iudges and Jurors: Their Functions, Quaiifwations and
Selection, S6 B.UJL. Rnv. 1, 73 (1956); 12 IowA L. Rzv. 43 (1926); 13 Mrcn.
L. Ruv. 391 (1914); 17 Mmux. L. REv. 299 (1933). For a discussion of the pos-
sible constitutional objections to removing voir dire from the hands of counsel,
see 15 DE PAuL L. REv. 107, 112 (1965).
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questions which precommit and influence may still arise. In an
attempt to reveal juror bias, a trial judge might ask such ques-
tions. A more adequate solution than court-conducted voir dire
would be to limit the questions which may be asked on voir dire.
Since the grounds for a challenge for cause, excepting actual
bias, are fairly definite in nature, examination to establish such
grounds is amenable to direct questions; the questioning attor-
ney has little opportunity to prejudice -the opposing party. This is
not true, however, in regard to questioning incident to estab-
lishing actual bias or to facilitating the exercise of peremptories.
By limiting voir dire in these two areas, the abuses of voir dire
could be substantially eliminated.
To establish actual bias, it is suggested that the voir dire exam-
ination be limited to a general question. The judge, working in
conjunction with counsel and -accepting such suggestions from
them as he deems useful, will preface this general question with a
statement of the facts of the case. Of course, this statement of
facts will necessarily be general in nature and will not contain any
reference to facts in dispute. After the basic facts of the case are
outlined by the judge, each juror will be asked generally if he
knows of any reason why he cannot decide the case in an impar-
tial manner70 There are distinct advantages to this type of pro-
cedure. Any reference to influential matter will be made in a gen-
eral manner without undue emphasis. Also, absolutely no oppor-
tunity exists for asking questions that will precommit the jurors.
The limitation to a general question will not be seriously detri-
mental to the questioning party. Since voir dire will disclose only
those conscious biases the examinee is willing to reveal, the sug-
gested general question seems to be as likely to uncover bias as
would extensive questioning. Even if the use of a general question
somewhat restricts the scope of voir dire, it is justified by the
necessity to protect the nonquestioning party.
To effectively curb abuses of voir dire, it is also necessary to
limit questioning for the purpose of exercising peremptories. In-
deed, if any questioning solely for the purpose of exercising per-
emptories is permitted, there is no feasible way to limit the scope
of examination. Since any question counsel may ask could pos-
sibly facilitate the exercise of peremptories, an attempt to limit
76. This type of question was advocated by the Illinois Supreme Court for
use on voir dire. See 1959 Iiwsom JuDicr CoN O iuNcr iEPoRT 56-60.
Under English practice, such a general type of question is used. 13 Mca. L.
REnv. 391 (1914).
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questions on the basis of the purpose for which they are asked is
futile. Because no definite standard can be applied, the question-
ing party may precommit and influence the jurors, much the
same as in examining for actual bias.
Although the existence of peremptory challenges can be justi-
fied, there is no good reason to allow interrogation on voir dire
in order to exercise them more effectively. If the rationale for
peremptories is to compensate for the difficulty in proving cause,
the examination should be limited to these questions allowed for
a challenge for cause. Also, if the rationale is to promote party
satisfaction with the jury, the need for questioning is doubtful. A
party would be dissatisfied if he was unable to prove cause, or
had an intuitive feeling about a particular juror.77 In either case,
merely allowing the peremptory challenge removes the party's
dissatisfaction. It may be argued, however, that party satisfaction
only results if peremptories can be exercised after counsel has had
an opportunity to investigate prospective jurors. Since it is im-
possible to make such an investigation before trial,78 interrogation
on voir dire is necessary. Accordingly, if party satisfaction is an
important policy of peremptories, perhaps examination incident
to peremptories has some merit. Even so, it is overshadowed by
the necessity to eliminate abuses which threaten the nonquestion-
ing party's right to a fair and impartial jury. A denial of the
opportunity to examine in order to exercise peremptories leaves
his right to a fair and impartial jury intact. If no ground for a
challenge for cause exists, a juror is assumed to be impartial. 79
V. CONCLUSION
In order to obtain an impartial jury, courts have concentrated
on insuring a liberal scope of examination on voir dire. This has
resulted in an impairment of the nonquestioning party's constitu-
tional right. Under existing procedures, the nonquestioning party
can do little to remedy his predicament. Furthermore, attempts
to establish standards for determining proper questions have
77. See 4 BLACKSTONE, CO3MENTARMS *353.
78. In Blackstone's time counsel may very well have been acquainted
with a majority of the panel. In today's urban society, however, a party wish-
ing to make an investigation of prospective jurors will be forced to do so out-
side of court. This is a totally impractical and legally questionable alternative.
See 17 3m. L. Ruv. 299, 301 (1933).
79. To be subject to a challenge for cause, a juror must be biased, either
implledly or actually. See note 20 supra.
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failed. Accordingly, it is necessary to place restrictions on the
questioning party. Balancing the interests of both parties dictates
the use of only a general question to reveal actual bias and to
facilitate the exercise of peremptories. The value of the present
broad scope of examination is doubtful; yet the harm that can
result from its use is irreparable.
